Michigan Law Review
Volume 66

Issue 5

1968

Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention
Ralph M. Carson

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph M. Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66 MICH. L. REV. 921 (1968).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

DISADVANTAGES OF A FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Ralph M. Carson*
are serious things and ought not to be repeated."
These words of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of North Carolina spoken in the closing debate of the Philadelphia Convention,
September 15, 1787, are pertinent today to the suggestion sometimes
bruited that in the exigency created by the latest revolutionary decisions of the Supreme Court1 article V of the Constitution should
be invoked to the end that Congress acting for the first time thereunder" ... call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which ...
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof . . . ." The imminence of action under this clause arises from the fact that
thirty-two state legislatures have now applied for a new federal
constitutional convention.2 In 1963 the legislatures of eighteen
states submitted to Congress thirty-eight applications calling for
such a convention; this is almost four times as many applications
as were submitted to Congress in the first century of the Constitution. Twelve of these dealt with apportionment of state legislatures.
Article V says that on application of two-thirds of the states
Congress "shall" call the convention for proposing amendments.
The imperative color of this word cannot be disregarded. It leaves
no discretion in Congress as to the convening of an article V assembly, although it may be consistent with some control by Congress
over the modalities.3 A deliberate refusal on the part of Congress
to call a convention, once the requisite number of state applications
were in hand, may be expected, by enlarged analogy to what has
been done in the recent civil rights cases and what is being proposed in the electoral apportionment cases, to bring into play the
powers of the Supreme Court to direct the setting up of the national
convention. Such a crisis is one to be avoided.
''CONVENTIONS

• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1917, University of Michigan; B.A., 1922,
Oxford University; J.D., 1923, University of Michigan.-Ed.
I. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Statement of Senator Ervin in introducing S. 2307. 113 CONG. REc. S. 11757
(daily ed. Aug. 17, 1967).
3. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., is an attempt to deal with the procedure of a
federal constitutional convention in various respects. Some of its provisions have been
pointedly criticized by Mr. Theodore C. Sorensen in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, Oct. 30, 1967.
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The novelty and drama of this conjuncture have suggested to
some that a national constitutional convention might be a good thing.
It might, some have intimated, serve as a useful school in the democratic process, educate the voters on a continental scale, and give
the people new opportunity to revise their organic law. Nothing in
my view could be more wrong. Nothing could show more misapprehension of the nature of political organisms or the foundation
of the vast structure which constitutes the American system today.
A general and unlimited federal constitutional convention would
at least be a futility and might be a disaster.

I.

EDMUND RANDOLPH'S MOTION FOR A
SECOND CONVENTION IN

1787

Pinckney's words were spoken in opposition to the motion of
Edmund Randolph at the close of the deliberations in Philadelphia.
The document prepared by the delegates not only was a mass of
compromises but contained provisions or omissions unsatisfactory
to many. Hence the motion was that the Constitution as drafted
be submitted to conventions of the several states, and that after
action by them it be re-submitted to a second convention for amendment or revision. In opposition to this proposal Pinckney urged the
confusion and contrariety of views that would arise from this procedure. Elbridge Gerry, Randolph, and George Mason supported
the motion, it was defeated, and they refused to sign the Constitution. Jefferson, not a delegate, considered the lack of a Bill of Rights
to be a capital defect of the draft, but told Madison that he would
not oppose adoption because he did not want to run the risk of a
second convention. Benjamin Franklin urged the delegates to suspend their honest doubts in the hope that difficulties would work
themselves out in practice.
The considerations which in 1787 militated against a second
constitutional convention are vastly stronger today.

II.

CHARACTER OF GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The body which would be called into being by the action of
Congress under article V would have revolutionary potentialities.
As recently pointed out by the Supreme Court, once the procedure
is set in motion, "there is no restraint on the kind of amendment
that may be offered."4 While Congress in initiating the procedure
4. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967).
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under article V will presumably fix a time and place and specify the
composition of the convention, and while it may seek to limit the
kind of amendment the convention shall propose, it would seem obvious that limitations of subject matter can be of no avail. Once convened, the body of delegates to propose amendments in accordance
with article V could, if they wished, raise the most fundamental questions by proposing a complete reorganization of the government.
They could take the revolutionary step which the States-General of
France took in 1789 in reconstituting themselves as the National
Assembly. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pointed out:
A convention to amend the Constitution, without there is [sic] an
express limitation as to the extent of their power, passed upon by
the people in determining the question of amendment, has inherently, by the very nature of the case under the great principle
peculiarly American, and quasi revolutionary in its character heretofore mentioned, absolute power, so far as may be necessary to
carry out the purpose for which they were called into existence, by
the popular will. Unless prohibited or restricted in the manner
specified by the people, the convention has a right, untrammelled by
mere legislative limitations,. to propose to the people for their consideration and adoption any plan they may see fit.5
·what we should be confronted with in a general constitutional
convention would be, presumably, nothing like the twenty-five
specific amendments which have from time to time in 170 years been
adopted by separate consideration. The effort of a general convention would presumably be the herculean one of a revised and improved constitutional structure for the entire country. The changes
would be embodied in the subtle, ambivalent, and refractory material which is the only instrument of the legal draftsman; that is,
in words. Under present circumstances the task is hopeless.
Every lawyer knows the treacherous, chameleon-like nature of the
verbiage out of which a new constitution would have to be constructed. It has long been pointed out that "[t]he same words may
have different meanings in different parts of the same act and of
course words may be used in a statute in a different sense from that
in which they are used in the constitution." 6 Or, as Justice Holmes
remarked in Towne v. Eisner: "A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought ... ." 1
5. Woods's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 67 (1874).
6. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916). See also Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
7. Id.
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What are the living thoughts which a new organic instrument
would be expected to take into account? Their number is great, their
complexity enormous. Federal-state relationships, the rights of
minorities, the problem of poverty, the new demands of urban
society, the allocation of the war power as between Congress and
the Executive, apportionment of votes in relation to representation
in state and federal governments, the church-state relationshipthese are only a few of the tensions and difficulties that now call for
resolution and in respect of which the phraseology of a new constitution would have to be chosen and measured. With jealousy and
cunning the strong forces active on various sides of these and other
great issues will in a constitutional convention strive to bend the
draftsmanship to their purpose.
Even if the correct solution of any of these problems could be
sketched out in the tumult and pressures of a national convention,
exactitude in formulating it cannot be expected. Delusive exactness,
as has been well said, is a source of fallacy throughout the law; 8 and
in any new draft of a constitution resort will have to be had, as
before, to generalities. The new words and phrases chosen for the
new organic instrument could not come to rest in any final meaning
until generations of judicial interpretation had explored and refined
their application to particular states of fact. What has happened
in the last century and a half in the fluctuating interpretation of the
old phrases-the general welfare clause, due process, equal protection
of the laws, the commerce clause-would have to be repeated in the
next century and a half in respect of the new product of a federal
constitutional convention. The ultimate results could not possibly
be foreseen by the draftsmen of 1968.
Rather one must anticipate that at the end of a long exegesis
in the courts historians would feel the need to revise the result from
a re-study of the verbal habits of the twentieth century, just as Professor Crosskey has attempted, in analyzing the existing Constitution, " ... to provide the reader ... with a specialized dictionary of
the eighteenth-century word-usages, and political and legal ideas,
which are needed for a true understanding of the Constitution ...." 9 Of the great generalities in which constitutions must be
expressed, the proposition is especially true which the late Charles
Curtis formulated for legal draftsmanship generally:
8. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. '\,\T. CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
STATES 5 (1953).

UNil'ED
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Words in legal documents . . . are simply delegations to others
of authority to apply them to particular things or occasions . . . .
They mean, therefore, not what their author intended them to
mean, or even what meaning he intended, or expected, reasonably
or not, others to give them. They mean, in the first instance, what
the person to whom they are addressed makes them mean. 10

So eight Supreme Court Justices now hold that the fourth amendment, adopted in 1791 to protect the right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," is violated by electronic surveillance
of conversations in a public telephone booth. 11
III.

GRAVE HANDICAPS OF PRESENT-DAY
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 possessed unique advantages. It came together in the atmosphere of crisis created by
Shays' Rebellion and other events which brought home to the
delegates the peril of the Union. It was favored by the attendance
of outstanding men possessed of a common intellectual background
through the literature of the eighteenth century Enlightenment.
"Really," Jefferson 1\Tl"ote to John Adams, "it is an assembly of
demigods." Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison are
best known to us; but the group included seven former state governors, twenty-eight former members of Congress, and eight signers
of the Declaration of Independence. Filled with the gravity of their
task, the delegates took measures to insure that their deliberations
should be conducted with the secrecy essential to collective reflection and foresight. Only the outcome in the form of the :finished
document was submitted to the public scrutiny.
By contrast with the situation in 1787, delegates to a national
constitutional convention of the present day would be subjected to
impossible conflicts and pressures destructive of any possibility of
calm deliberation. The three millions of the Atlantic fringe of settlements living principally by agriculture have now spread across a
continent wholly unknown to the draftsmen of 1787 and have
multiplied to a mass of 200 millions, diverse in racial origin. The
simple agricultural habits of colonial times, upon whose virtues
10. C. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION
132, 156 (1953).
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., protesting against
making the Court "a continuously functioning constitutional convention").
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Jefferson relied for honest rule by the majority,12 have given place
to a prodigious complex of industry, commerce, and finance, within
a statutory framework undreamed of in the eighteenth century. Even
more important, the functions of government in relation to the
economic activity of the country have completely altered. Whereas in
the eighteenth century contacts between the government and business or agriculture were trifling, so that in the view of Jefferson and
his school the only good government was a weak one, today political
forces flowing from Washington or the state capitals interpenetrate,
where they do not actually condition, the economic behavior of
every citizen. The welfare state has come into being. Government
is in business, and the business of government is very largely to
divert the product of labor and industry to the maintenance or
amelioration of various sections of the population, in the ratio more
or less of their voting power. Hence at the present day the stakes of
constitution-making are inconceivably great and differ toto coelo
from what the delegates of 1787 had to deal ·with.
·
In these completely transformed perspectives, we must realize
the handicaps to which a modern constitutional convention would
be subjected. In the first place, its membership would be chiefly
composed of political partisans, aligned in accordance with the
economic forces, the racial or religious affiliations, and the ideologies
which in more or less degree the great historic parties serve. These
are the "factions" whose advent Washington dreaded. They are
natural and inevitable in a democratic society, and their impact
upon the processes of a national convention, however grave and
momentous the issues, cannot be escaped.
In the New York State Convention of 1967, for example, the
effort was originally made to select delegates for their personal
eminence and character, regardless of party affiliation. This failed;
delegates were chosen by the electoral process, and the convention
was organized on party lines with the Democratic speaker of the
State Assembly as chairman. The Democratic majority yielded to
the effort of the Catholic Diocese of New York to eliminate from the
existing constitution the stringent prohibition against state aid to
denominational schools, in the hope of obtaining tax money for
Catholic education. The new constitution with this among other
revisions was on the insistence of the convention chairman submitted
to the voters as an entirety, rather than in sections which would
12. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787; see S.
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON

123 (1943).

PADOVER,
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have isolated the parochial school amendment for separate vote.
In consequence, the entire new draft was rejected by the electorate.
A federal constitutional convention will necessarily abound in
divisive issues of this kind.
Moreover, the proceedings of convention delegates will be conducted in the intense glare of publicity. Every word will be transcribed. Imputations of motive, analyses, and predictions will fill the
newspaper columns and flood the airways. Television will obtrude
itself on the proceedings, in the name of the so-called "right of the
people to know." A multitude of issues clamoring for attention will
leave no time for reflection or long-range thought. With respect to
the New York State Convention of 1967, for example, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York found affairs were so
conducted as to preclude meaningful consideration by the convention of informed comment on such matters as the judiciary article.
The schedules followed by the convention allowed only forty-eight
hours for public scrutiny of that important item. In the case of a
national convention, the sacred ritual of the quadrennial nominating procedure will assert itself; and the deliberations of the
constitution-makers will probably have to be carried on in the atmosphere of chaos and carnival which has been developed for the
nomination of presidents.
Finally, the terminology of the resultant document will have two
characteristics that can be surely predicted. For one thing, it will be
marked by the grandiloquence which characterizes (as shown by the
Congressional Record) our political pronouncements. In addition,
and with a view to the long-range effect upon the powerful interests,
economic and other, to be affected by a new constitution, the draft
produced will be loaded with the best semantic devices that the
research psychologists of Madison Avenue can create.13
In short, a national constitutional convention in our day must
of necessity be the very opposite in character and conduct of the
conclave which among the groves and classic facades of Philadelphia
worked out the structure of the new commonwealth which was to
represent the N ovus Ordo Saeclorum.
l!l. Thus the Temporary National Economic Committee, whose hearings in 19391940 were conducted with a view to framing legislation in the banking and financial
field, devised for use in examining witnesses a phraseology, divided between "good
words" and "bad words," which would color the testimony in the manner desired by
examining counsel. This phraseology was created in advance of the hearings by an
expert in public psychology. See Krock, The Prompters and Stage Managers of TNEC
Hearings, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1939, at 22, col. 5.
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IRRELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

TO PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS

In reality the concept of a new-minted organic law to reorganize
and redirect the fabric of the national government is a fallacious
one. The idea no doubt derives from the Philadelphia Convention
and the somewhat false view of that classic episode conveyed by
Gladstone's description of the American Constitution as "the most
wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and
purpose of man." Justified in some degree, this is also misleading.
The Constitution of 1787 was by no means a new creation. It had
been preceded by many political instruments on this side of the
Atlantic. It codified American governmental experience as well as
the principles which the draftsmen derived from the Magna Carta,
the British constitution as represented by Blackstone, Montesquieu,
and the Greek confederacies described in Plutarch or Aristotle.
Behind the Constitution lay the Articles of Confederation (1777),
and behind that the defense arrangements of the United Colonies
of New England (1643), the Albany Conference of Four Colonies to
Concert Measures against the Indians (1684), William Penn's aborted
plan of union (1697), and the plan of union proposed by Benjamin Franklin in 1754 to commissioners of seven colonies for dealing with the French danger. Experience had also been gathered
from the Stamp Act Congress which met in New York in 1765, as
well as the First and Second Continental Congresses.14
Not only are the words of the Constitution a codification of
experience, but on them as a result of long usage and judicial
interpretation has been evolved a living governmental structure.
This encloses political processes of great subtlety and delicacy,
independent of, even though originating from, the instrument of
1787. As Justice Holmes said in 1vlissouri v. Holland,
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.15

The Constitution we now have is much more than the few
hundred words of the Philadelphia draftsmen. It is the entire fabric
14. See C. BURDICK, THE LAW
15. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

3-22 (1922).
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of usage, understanding, political behavior, and statutory implementation, erected on that base and compounded with the glosses
of many judicial decisions. Evolution has brought changes which
habit has confirmed. One instance is the transformation of the
electoral college. Thus the American political structure is a complex
living organism, no longer a mere document. To interrupt its functioning by an attempted general revision of the original framework
would be an experiment presumptuous in nature and fraught with
peril. To such an attempt might fitly be applied the words used by
Edmund Burke with regard to the British constitution:
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his clock,
is however sufficiently confident to think he can safely take to pieces,
and put together at his pleasure, a moral machine of another guise,
importance, and complexity, composed of far other wheels, and
springs, and balances, and counteracting and co-operating powers.16

As a nation we have reached that stage of maturity, we are so
much a going concern, that our constitutional development must be
allo·wed to proceed, as in the six generations just passed, by the
accretions of use and practice. As with the British constitution, its
essence resists definition. Jefferson records a dinner conversation
in 1791 at which John Adams and Alexander Hamilton differed as
to what the British constitution really was. Said Adams: "Purge that
constitution of its corruption, and give to its popular branch
equality of representation, and it would be the most perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man." Hamilton said: "Purge
it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of
representation, and it would become an impracticable government:
as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most
perfect government which ever existed." 17 Black.stone, after describing the three branches of King, Lords, and Commons, thought the
British constitution was so admirably tempered and compounded
that nothing could endanger or hurt it but the destruction of this
equilibrium. He thought that, if the independence of any one of the
three was ever lost, "there would soon be an end of our constitution," and the people would be "reduced to a state of anarchy." 18
'-¥alter Bagehot in writing The English Constitution knew better.
Development since his time has gone even further in concentrating
16. E. BURKE, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs in 3 WoRKS OF
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 111 (H. Bohn ed. 1855).
17. PADOVER, supra note 12, at 1211.
18. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES Introduction § 2.

THE

RIGHT
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all power in the House of Commons, so as to create a political system more flexible and more responsive to the popular will than any
other, and as stable as our own.
This course of steady constitutional evolution is the only one
practicable for a society of the size and complexity of the United
States. For individual amendments, separately weighed and considered as codified solutions of separate problems, there is always
room. It is the daring innovation of a great assize to rewrite the
classic document of 1787 which seems to me the height of presumption and the source of disaster.

